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# PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS—I

BY DAVID JAYNE HILL

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NOTHING is so important to the success of a nation in its intercourse with other nations as clearness, firmness, and continuity in the foreign policy of its Government. If foreign policy is to possess these qualities, it must not in any degree be affected by personal or partisan considerations. It must be based solely upon the national interests, with a due sense of the national responsibilities.

So long as a political Administration adheres to this conception of its duty, it deserves the support of every citizen in whatever public action may be necessary. It would be an unworthy and unpatriotic act to weaken the Government in an emergency or to turn a national misfortune to political advantage. There are, however, circumstances that not only justify, but imperatively demand, a critical examination of the course pursued in the conduct of foreign affairs. These circumstances exist when there has been a radical departure from the established policies of the country. If, in addition, there has been a conspicuous failure to defend the rights of the nation or its citizens and to provide for their protection, or to perform the obvious duties of a responsible Government, not merely criticism but public condemnation is demanded. When, however, such aberrations and failures are boldly defended as wise and commendable, and are boasted of as glorious achievements, they become unavoidable political issues, flung into the arena of debate in a manner that renders it impossible to ignore them.

"We challenge comparison of our record," reads the Democratic Platform of 1916, "with those of any party of any time. . . . Our foreign affairs were dominated by commercial interests for their selfish ends. . . . Under

our Administration, under a leadership that has never faltered, these abuses have been corrected, and our people have been freed therefrom. . . . It has made the honor and the ideals of the United States its standard alike in negotiation and in action."

Passing by the calumnious assertion that, prior to the present Administration, "our foreign affairs were dominated by commercial interests for their selfish ends"—which has for its obvious purpose simply to forestall argument by abuse—in a quite different spirit, and with close attention to demonstrable facts, we shall examine in the course of this review the "record" on which are based the boast of a "leadership that has never faltered," and the pretense that the "honor and the ideals of the United States" have been "the standard of this Administration in negotiation and in action."

When we inquire in what specific negotiations and actions this standard has been applied, we receive the answer: "Well, the President has kept us out of war"; as if such a merely negative incident as being "kept out of war," when no nation has desired to declare war upon us, were a complete fulfillment of the demands made by the honor and ideals of the United States!

Peace, without doubt, is one of our most cherished ideals; but no one will contend that a peace that has not been disturbed by threats is anything to boast about. The fallacy now being thrust upon the country is, that there is no middle ground between the course pursued by the Administration and war. These, it is pretended, were the only alternatives, and between them a choice was necessary. Had it not been for the wisdom of the Administration, we are assured, we should have had war! By whom, we ask, were these alternatives presented? By whom, and when, and how, were we forced to this happy choice?

But, unfortunately, the "record" shows that, upon two separate occasions, neither of which demanded warlike action, the Administration has provoked a dangerous situation, and has committed every act characteristic of war, including the invasion of foreign territory and the destruction of innocent lives, and has subjected our soldiers and sailors to every danger and consequence that war involves. That this unavowed belligerency has been characterized by an extraordinary combination of intrusiveness and timidity, of de-

ferred decision and untimely action, and has been so hesitating as to make it ineffectual and so fruitless as to render it inglorious, does not in the least degree redeem these vacillations from being in reality acts of war. And if it be a noble service to have kept us out of war, what shall be said of the blunders that have needlessly involved us in it without a benefit?

There is, therefore, no reason why the most considerate and loyal patriot, having always in mind the true interests of his country, should entertain the least scruple about subjecting the Administration's conduct of foreign affairs to a dispassionate review. On the contrary, in consideration of the extreme delicacy of our relations to other Governments at a time like the present, when the whole future of this republic may be compromised by an error, it is of supreme importance that every citizen should satisfy his mind whether or not the national safety, prestige, and honor have been properly maintained, and to consider whether the course pursued deserves a renewal of confidence by the electorate.

Before entering upon a statement of the specific acts of the present Administration at Washington and of the conditions they were intended to meet, it is desirable to consider the attitude of mind, and the preparation for wise and effective action upon international questions, with which the President approached his task.

Having long been a student of political theories and conversant with the history of the United States, about which he had written ably, the President was exceptionally fitted to set a high value upon experience in diplomacy; a fact which might properly have led him to surround himself with men of experience in these matters. On the contrary, making a clean sweep of the higher diplomatic representatives of the United States, soon after his inauguration, and promptly filling their posts (with some notable exceptions), with political supporters, the President selected for the head of the Department of State a statesman whose eligibility for that office was generally recognized as consisting mainly in the fact that the President owed to him his nomination to that office.

As if to make amends for the lack of experience in the conduct of international business on the part of his Secretary of State, the President named as Counsellor of the Depart-

ment one of the most distinguished international jurists in the country. Had this highly competent authority been placed in responsible charge of the Department, and its decisions left to his judgment, there would, no doubt, have been continuity and consistency in the course pursued; but, for reasons that will presently be stated, the service of this experienced adviser was rendered practically nugatory, except in matters relatively inconsequential; and, after a year of ineffectual effort to serve as a balance-wheel to the erratic energies of his superior officer, this learned and experienced counsellor, finding his advice unacceptable, in despair resigned his office.

In a matter of such vital interest to the country as its foreign relations, it has been felt that the nation should enjoy the benefit of having in its service its best expert talent, and of keeping merely partisan interests and influence remote from the actual work of the Department of State; which should represent the whole country, and not merely the part of it that has won the election. Like the Army and the Navy, the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, when once properly organized should be kept as free as possible from purely partisan influence. It is discouraging, therefore, to read in the learned history of *America's Foreign Relations*, by Professor Willis Fletcher Johnson, an entirely non-partisan work, that with the advent of the present Administration, a change, "lamentable in character and some of its results, was the restoration of the partisan spoils system in the diplomatic and consular service. For a number of years," this writer continues, "the civil service merit system had been increasingly applied to those departments. Men were promoted from place to place in accordance with their deserts, and were retained in the service without regard to political affiliations. But under Wilson and Bryan all that was changed. Some of the most expert and valuable diplomats of ambassadorial and ministerial rank were curtly dismissed to make room for inexperienced men who had been politically useful to the incoming Administration. In some minor yet highly important places, especially in Latin-America, this process was carried to a scandalous extreme. The Secretary of State actually sent out a request to be informed of places to which 'deserving' members of his own party might be appointed; 'deserving' having reference only to their partisan and factional labors in pro-

moting his political interests. In at least one conspicuous case this process resulted in the appointment of a man so grossly unfit as to give rise to an international scandal."

There was, however, another radical change brought in by the new Secretary of State, which has received less comment, but has even more vitally affected the interests of the nation and its prestige as an international influence than the one already mentioned.

Secretary Bryan came to his office with the consciousness that much distinction had been already won, and was yet to be acquired, by the advocacy of universal peace. Twice the Nobel Prize had been awarded to distinguished citizens of the United States for their efforts in this direction. Great and powerful organizations had been formed for the promotion of peace, and President Taft had received much commendation for his efforts to advance the cause of the judicial settlement of international disputes, but without compromising the dignity and prestige of the United States.

With a noble infatuation, the new Secretary resolved to outdo all his predecessors. They had advocated courts of justice. He would apply a scheme that would make war impossible. No matter what circumstances might arise, the United States should never meet them with armed resistance. He would create a new era in human history. He would demonstrate that all men belong to one great fraternity, in which brotherly love should dominate over all selfish passions. To accomplish this, only one thing, he thought, was necessary: namely, that some one nation, great in area, wealth, and population, should announce to the world that it was not only perfectly harmless, but was willing, temporarily at least, to endure injury, insult, humiliation and even contempt, if thereby it could convince the world that the total abandonment of armed resistance and foreign aggression was possible to a great and powerful nation. This conspicuous example once placed before the world, every civilized nation, in admiration of such noble conduct, would for very shame mend its morals and manners, and thus produce a universal reign of peace!

By nature an intuitionist, the Secretary considered all this entirely practicable. No one, it appeared, had ever treated international affairs in a strictly generous and neighborly way. He would try it. The "people" everywhere, he believed, would like and approve it. It would be

original, even revolutionary; but so much the better. The Secretary, who had been considered the oracle of his party, was in need of a new watchword. "Free silver" had been repudiated. "Imperialism" had not been taken seriously. "Public ownership of railroads" had received little sympathy from his own party. "Predatory wealth" had not carried him to the Presidency. But "Universal Peace"—that was a sentiment to conjure with!

With little comprehension of the real aims, methods, and ambitions of foreign Governments, and utterly oblivious of the deep antagonisms that were at that very moment brewing the stupendous conflict that has since shaken the whole of civilization to its foundations, Secretary Bryan felt no need of explicit information, and most certainly derived none from the outposts of our foreign service, for a long time wholly absorbed in the details of seeking domiciles in foreign lands, into whose purposes of state they had not penetrated. With a feeling that most Governments were too plutocratic really to represent the "people," he placed his reliance upon the power and disposition of the masses of mankind to overrule mere absolute authority. Taking as his standard the intelligent, independent, and well instructed masses of our American citizenship, he believed all "peoples" to be like them. Their Governments might, perhaps, be warlike, ambitious, and dangerous; but he intended to have the "peoples"—whom he regarded as just, generous, and really devoted to peace—clearly understand that it was with them, and not their rulers, that he desired to deal.

It was a noble aspiration, and does credit to the Secretary's private feelings; but the error was to suppose that private feelings are the materials of which public policies may be made.

Consistently with his theory of the perversity of rulers and the virtue of the ruled, he felt a lofty scorn of all official rules and precedents, and resolved to sweep aside not only all impediments of form and ceremony, but all conventional customs and legal precedents as well, and to deal with nations as he would with his kindly neighbors, believing that, like them, all foreign "peoples" were really good at heart, and would be equally ready to make everything over on a new pattern to be prescribed by him.

Personally, the diplomats all liked Secretary Bryan, as every one does who personally knows his kindly optimism;

but no one at first took him quite seriously. Then it was perceived that, by yielding to his one supreme wish to become the hero of universal peace, all minor matters could be easily disposed of; and, as no one stood in fear of aggression by the United States, there was on the part of other nations no obstacle to embracing an opportunity for exercising a free hand in any direction they chose, with the assurance that the American Government, committed to a policy of inaction and postponement, would in no way interfere with whatever plans and purposes they might have in mind.

It would be incredible, if the facts did not compel the admission of it, that the appointed guardian of the interests and honor of a great nation in its world relations should so far forget the fiduciary character of his position as to believe himself entitled to substitute for settled public policies his own fantasies regarding international relations, and to leave practically out of consideration the responsibility of the nation for the maintenance of existing international law, the right of the nation to equal treatment everywhere, and of all citizens to the protection of their legal rights. What, for example, would be thought of a policeman whose idea of his duty permitted him publicly to announce that on his beat no one would be arrested and no one sent to jail? But this was precisely what Secretary Bryan did. He informed his colleague, the Secretary of the Navy, it was reported, that there would be no need to increase the number of ships in the United States Navy, or ever to use those already in existence; for, while he remained in charge of foreign affairs, there would be no war with any nation!

As all his subsequent conduct shows, Secretary Bryan was most earnest and sincere in making this statement, and was, no doubt, proud to have his intention published at home and abroad.

He was promptly taken at his word, and with equal promptitude he proceeded to carry his theory into execution. The previously existing arbitration treaties, which contained a reservation of questions involving the "independence, vital interests, and honor" of the country, the Secretary found insufficient; for the defense of these might sometime lead to armed conflict, to which he was totally opposed. He, therefore, at once began negotiations with more than thirty Powers, great and small, binding the United States to com-



plete passivity in all circumstances for one year, until a mixed commission had decided whether or not a violated right might be enforced, or a wrong prevented; thus giving to great foreign Powers an opportunity to inflict upon us an irreparable injury, and to small ones a way to escape punishment by subsequent apology or change of Government, in abeyance of our right to take preventive measures at the proper time.

The result of these treaties was that the United States was solemnly pledged, upon its honor, not to resent actively any insult, injury, or humiliation that any one of the adherents to this agreement might for any reason offer, and to rest content with making only a verbal protest until an entire year had elapsed. These treaties made no provision with regard to alliances between the other signatories contemplating possible united action which might involve the interests of the United States. They offered to the United States no immunities or exemptions in case, as a neutral Power, it should be exposed to injury resulting from their mutual quarrels; and the co-signatories made no such agreements with one another as the United States made with them. In effect, therefore, the Bryan treaties simply eliminated from the thoughts and plans of Governments, hitherto restrained by consideration of what action the United States might take, all concern regarding the views or purposes of the Administration at Washington—which, they were assured, would do nothing. And this assurance was perfectly well founded. There was a complete commitment of the United States to a passive policy, regardless of conditions, leaving all the adherents to these treaties free to do to one another, or with one another, and against the interests of this country, whatever they pleased.

Even the moral and advisory influence of the United States was thus seriously impaired; for, with the certainty that immediate action by our Government was out of the question, the advice of the United States no longer possessed any international value. It could not, under the new treaties, employ its military resources, such as they were, even to defend its own rights or those of its citizens until a year of discussion had ended.

The mistake in urging these engagements, by which the United States ceased to be an active agent in international affairs, was not, of course, in the earnest aspiration for uni-

versal peace; but in proclaiming and pledging the passivity of this country at a time when nearly the whole world was about to be involved in war, and when the influence of a nation depended wholly upon a belief in its firm determination to defend its own interests and stand fearlessly for its own principles. It is incredible that any well-informed person could have imagined that such a scheme as that put forth by the Secretary of State could be made universal; or that it would be adopted by any of the Great Powers, not in formal alliance, as between themselves; and the effect has been just what might have been foreseen. It was an act of self-effacement on the part of a great nation in the midst of a world conflict; in which there was no need that it should participate, but which a valiant and self-reliant nation of the magnitude and former prestige of the United States might have influenced in important ways, had it not previously and voluntarily exposed itself to the complete neglect of other nations. Such a Power as the American Republic has in the past sometimes shown itself to be, might have made itself the effective guardian of neutral rights, which have been violated in every manner conceivable. But, knowing beforehand that the United States, whatever happened, would positively take no action, the merely formal protests of our Government have been treated with inattention, and sometimes with open and continued defiance.

One historian has presented this situation even more emphatically than this. "Amidst this unprecedented profusion of irenic efforts," he says, "and probably in part because of them and as a counterblast against them, preparations for the world's greatest war were at first furtively and then openly pushed to completion." Certain it is that, when this conflict began, no trouble was taken to inquire what the position of the United States would be regarding it; and some time before that, several European Powers that had uniformly waited for the action of the Government of the United States before making a decision, openly and unitedly recognized a Mexican Government which President Wilson peremptorily refused to recognize. Before the Administration was a year old, it was evident that the prestige of this Government, which previously had taken the initiative in great world crises, and had been able to promote peace between Great Powers, no longer existed. Ineffectual in its own sphere of influence, as it soon showed itself to be, it had

already become in the Eastern Hemisphere a completely negligible quantity.

What, in these conditions, was to become of the traditional primacy of the United States—as the oldest, largest, and most powerful of the American republics—in affairs primarily American?

In 1913, Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua; and in 1914, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Santo Domingo, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Ecuador, in the order named, were co-signatories with the United States of the treaty providing that all disputes between each of them and the United States, “of every nature whatsoever,” should be referred to an International Commission, in which these republics had equal representation; and that no action in any case should be taken for one year.

In this engagement there was no condition named regarding a change of Government; the assumption being that national entity is always persistent, and that the parties bound by this contract are the *de facto* Governments of these republics, whatever they may be. Upon no other assumption could these treaties possess any value or lead to any consequences.

The effect of this agreement theoretically, was, of course, to end the tradition of primacy on the part of the United States, and to place all these American republics absolutely on an equal footing, regardless of their form of political organization, their governmental changes, or their responsibility for their conduct. Practically, however, as an older and more responsible member in this family of states, the tradition of the primacy of the United States could not be wholly ignored; for Europe, debarred by the Monroe Doctrine from meddling with American affairs, held the United States in some degree responsible for law and order in this hemisphere; and it was certain that, as soon as the regulative influence of this Government was wholly withdrawn, that of European nations would take its place.

This obvious fact did not, of course, escape the attention of the present Administration; but its doctrine of passive endurance removed the possibility of effective action, and left the field open for a merely pedagogical intervention, laying down the rules that good republics were expected to obey.

with an intimation that bad ones would be held in disrepute, but overlooking the fact that the Secretary of State had sequestered the rod behind the teacher's desk.

An occasion for the first lesson was the condition of Mexico. The Madero Government, established in 1911, had been confronted with revolt in 1912, and early in 1913 had been overthrown by a counter-revolution. In February of that year, General Victoriano Huerta, one of the ablest of the Mexican generals, having possession of the City of Mexico, Vera Cruz, and a considerable portion of territory, was endeavoring to pacify the country, which contained 6,000,000 Indians, 6,000,000 half-breeds, and about 3,000,000 white men, of whom only about 1,500,000 could read and write, scattered over 2,000,000 square miles, with an average of less than twenty persons to the square mile.

This situation at the close of President Taft's Administration had caused grave concern in the United States. Would Huerta, who had superseded Madero in authority in Mexico, be able to subdue the anarchy of the country, or would it continue? And if it did continue, how would it be possible to prevent American soil from being used as a base of supplies for a chronic revolution? That was a problem that President Taft had been compelled to face, and he had solved it by asking Congress to give him power to suspend the exportation of arms and munitions to any American country that might be employing them for domestic violence. This power was accorded to him and exercised by him, the Huerta control was making rapid progress, and European countries, confident of his success, were supplying him with financial aid; when, on February 23, 1913, only nine days before the expiration of President Taft's term of office, Madero, who had already resigned the Presidency, was shot and killed while a prisoner of state in the City of Mexico.

That the entire Mexican situation was an inheritance from President Taft's Administration, and that President Wilson merely followed his example in the treatment of it, has been repeatedly asserted, with the inference that all responsibility for trouble in Mexico must be attributed to the previous Administration. It is true that President Taft had not recognized the Huerta Government, but it is also true that he had not committed this country to a policy of absolute non-recognition. Without embarrassing his successor in the closing days of his Presidency, he left the question to be de-

cided in the light of Huerta's future attitude and behavior toward the United States, and his *de facto* power and disposition to perform the duties of a responsible Government.

The new Administration pursued an entirely different course. Assuming without conclusive evidence that Huerta was personally responsible for Madero's death,—a conclusion which Huerta himself denounced as a malicious accusation, and of which the American Ambassador to Mexico, the Honorable Henry Lane Wilson, who had spent many years of service in Spanish-American countries, expresses strong doubts,—it not only resolved never, under any circumstances, to recognize a Government of which Huerta was the head, even though he were elected to the Presidency by the Mexican people, but to overthrow and destroy his authority, and supersede it by the organization of a new Government in harmony with Mr. Wilson's own conception of what a truly constitutional Government should be. In this unprecedented course, the action was not only in strong contrast with that of President Taft, who refused in any way to meddle with the internal affairs of Mexico, but a complete innovation upon the traditional policy of the United States: which had uniformly been to leave every independent country free to form and accept such a Government as it is able to sustain, and to hold that Government responsible for the protection of American life and property within its borders, and liable to the payment of indemnity for a failure to protect them.

Whatever his private character may have been,—and it is no concern of ours what it was,—General Huerta indisputably was, and was declared by competent authorities to be, the head of a *de facto* Government having its seat in the City of Mexico. Not only so, but his was the only responsible authority to which an appeal for justice could be made in that republic.

In laying down the novel and dangerous doctrine that he would not recognize any Government in Mexico unless it was *de jure* according to his own standard of constitutionality, the President made himself the arbiter of a people's destiny; and, instead of aiding them in the support of a Government such as they were able to possess, he decreed that they should be subject to continued anarchy until they could evolve out of social chaos a form of Government which he could sanction, to be placed in the hands of men whose private characters he could personally approve.

To carry out such an unprecedented programme, unusual means must be adopted; for the ordinary machinery of diplomacy is ill adapted to such an enterprise. Determined to overthrow Huerta, who was protecting American lives and property, the President, preferring advice from less responsible sources, at first ignored and then recalled the American Ambassador; and, although still maintaining diplomatic relations through a *Chargé d'Affaires*, began privately to inquire, through insurgent Mexicans, as to who in Mexico could best carry out his purpose to destroy Huerta's Government and establish one to his own liking.

Selecting as his "personal spokesman and representative" in Mexico the Honorable John Lind,—a statesman of Scandinavian origin unfamiliar with the laws, language, and people of that country,—the President instructed him to inform General Huerta that fighting in Mexico must cease; that he must promptly abdicate; that he must pledge himself not to be a candidate for the Presidency of Mexico; that a constitutional election must be held; and that a Government thus constituted, and none other, would be recognized by the United States.

So far as Huerta was concerned, this mission was utterly futile; and Lind, finding his orders disregarded, soon retired to a cloistered retreat at Vera Cruz, where he could hold parley with discontented Mexicans, by whom he soon became convinced that there were influences at work in Mexico which, if fostered and encouraged by the United States, could make serious trouble for Huerta. In the meantime, the latter's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Senor Gamboa, in a strictly diplomatic and highly dignified note, replied, that President Wilson had entirely misconceived the situation; that General Huerta's position as "Provisional President" was strictly in accordance with the laws and Constitution of Mexico; that of the 27 States, 3 Territories, and 1 Federal District composing the Republic, the Government had 18 States, the 3 Territories, and the Federal District under absolute control, with an army of 80,000 men in the field to pacify the other States; that it was practically impossible to stop hostilities in that country so long as rebels secretly obtained arms from the United States (as they were said then to be doing); that the opposition to Huerta was of a wholly unwarranted character; and that the question of the Presidency must be decided at the polls by the Mexican people at

their next election. In reply, Lind was instructed to repeat the demand for a constitutional election, at which Huerta must not be a candidate; adding that, if these conditions were complied with, a loan of money would be supplied by the United States. Gamboa indignantly spurned this type of "dollar diplomacy" as a virtual attempt at bribery; Lind remained at Vera Cruz, to watch the effect of his deliverances; the *Chargé d'Affaires* continued to reinforce them at the City of Mexico, where he was most kindly treated by Huerta; and, on August 27, 1913, President Wilson announced at Washington, to an acquiescent but somewhat disquieted Congress, his conviction that Huerta should be compelled to retire from authority in Mexico and some other person be selected for the Presidency of that country.

Perceiving that, without the employment of armed force, directly or indirectly, his recommendations were nugatory, he then instituted a system of secret diplomacy unparalleled in history since Louis XV; sending his private agents, responsible to himself alone, into Mexico to ascertain which one of the several rebel leaders would be most effective in overpowering Huerta, and most amenable to his purpose in constituting a new Government for Mexico. In the meantime, six Great Powers had recognized the Huerta Government, and their citizens were taking its securities.

Although the bandit Francisco Villa, at that time well known in Mexico as a professional brigand, and later furnishing the occasion for an invasion of Mexico by an army of the United States,—in preference to Carranza, Zapata, and the others,—was favored by the secret agents as the most auspicious candidate for the political regeneration of Mexico, no effort was made to discourage any of the other insurgent elements, on the principle that the first necessity was to destroy Huerta; yet, at that time, the only safe place for American residents in Mexico was within Huerta's jurisdiction; and wherever his authority was effective, as in the City of Mexico, their persons and their property were as safe as in New York.

As a result of the secret conferences of his agents in the insurgent camps, the President, on December 2, 1913, officially announced to Congress his policy of "watchful waiting"; that is, of waiting to see which of the insurgent forces would succeed in destroying Huerta's Government. On February 3, 1914, in order to facilitate this operation, he officially re-

moved the embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions to Mexico, thus completely reversing the policy of President Taft; and any group of marauders was at liberty to equip itself for the successful looting of the country. Villa was enabled to gather to his standard a large and well furnished army; and, four months after "watchful waiting" was announced, on April 2, 1914, after eleven days of hard fighting, this bandit had captured from the Federal troops the important town of Torreon.

In the meantime, evidence was pouring into the Department of State showing that in the zone of insurgent activity American citizens, unable to obey the Department's injunction to escape from the country, were being robbed and killed and their women violated, in their houses or on the way to the United States; that churches were being desecrated, priests assassinated, and nuns outraged. Upon protestation by a Catholic clergyman that these abominations were the work of the followers of Carranza and Villa, our Secretary of State is said to have retorted, as if in extenuation, that he was informed that the followers of Huerta had committed similar outrages on two American women from Iowa; but he did not say what action had been taken by the Department in that case.

Does the correspondence with the Huerta Government show that indemnity for such outrages was ever demanded? There is no sign in the instructions to Lind that any American interests were to be protected. On the contrary, the instructions read, that he is "to give every possible evidence that we act *in the interest of Mexico alone*, and not in the interest of any person or body of persons who may have personal or property claims in Mexico." There is no published complaint regarding the exposure of life or property within Huerta's jurisdiction.

Repeatedly the Senate has asked for the reports of outrages committed upon American citizens in Mexico and for the correspondence with the Huerta Government, but these requests have been declined as "incompatible with the interests of the United States." Although the exchange of notes with European Governments has been followed by their prompt publication, only a few isolated communications between the United States and Mexico have been published in any form. The private correspondence of the secret agents has never been open even to Congressional inspection. From



other sources, however, we know that Lind was obsessed with the idea that the crux of the Mexican problem was the Anglo-American relations; and that the way to solve it was by the removal of the embargo on arms, thus enabling the insurgents to destroy Huerta's Government, and then to recognize the one that would best please the Government of the United States, Villa being at that time the most promising candidate for that distinction.

That there was united opposition to the President's course in Mexico on the part of the Great Powers, there is no doubt. All were amazed at it, and to some extent resented it. It was not the non-recognition of Huerta's Government, but the attack upon him, which they deplored. They knew that the overthrow of Huerta meant a long period of anarchy in Mexico, unless the United States intervened with overwhelming force to prevent it. That ultimate American occupation was the real underlying purpose was suspected; and, of course, not desired. Still, if nothing was meant but the destruction of an existing Government, with no intention of constructing another, except by the slow, devastating process of Mexican insurgency, what was to become of foreign interests in Mexico?

Were there, then, actual combinations by the European Powers to sustain Huerta, and defeat the Government of the United States? Their archives will some day answer this question. We know that in November, 1913, the *Multicolor*, an illustrated newspaper published in the City of Mexico, brought out a cartoon in which England, Germany, and France were represented as painting the White House green,—the expression "to paint green" being a Spanish idiom for insult and vituperation.

In January and February, 1914, there were other indications of strained relations. When, therefore, on March 5, 1914,—just a year after he had entered actively upon his office,—the President read to Congress, as out of the blue sky, an imperative message, couched in language so extraordinary and so mysterious as to arouse the curiosity of the whole country, it was felt that the nation was facing a crisis, the more portentous because its true nature was in no way explained.

In this message the President demanded the immediate repeal of a clause in the Panama Canal Act, of August 24, 1912, providing for the exemption of tolls for our coastwise

vessels—legislation which his own party platform had specifically approved, and which he himself had personally supported. It had been argued that, in passing from New York to San Francisco, an American coasting vessel was virtually merely skirting the shores of the United States, notwithstanding the fact that its course enveloped the whole of Mexico; but other Powers had interests in Mexico. Was there a united protest filed in Washington regarding exclusive jurisdiction over the Panama Canal as an American possession? It is not intended here to discuss this subject. But we cannot overlook the dramatic form of the President's urgency. "Without raising the question whether we were right or wrong," on the ground that foreign nations took a view of it different from our own, he declared: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with *other matters* of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure."

Who could deny to the President a request thus urged? Who could refuse, however much puzzled, to come to the rescue of the Administration's foreign policy, so soon menaced with possible disaster? But what necessity made this rescue so imperative? The archives may some day answer. Perhaps the President was merely frightened. In any case, we are left to wonder what could be of "greater delicacy and nearer consequence" than the performance of an international duty, if that were the sole cause for action; unless it might be a national right, if that also was to be considered? And if it was merely a question of right or of duty, why not submit it to judicial determination, and thus forever dispose of it in a legal manner? But a crisis in foreign policy, that required immediate retreat! Who exacted it? For what purpose was it exacted? What permission, otherwise to be withheld, was to be obtained for it? The country has not been informed. Perhaps the immediately subsequent action of the Government at Washington may throw some light upon it.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.

(To be concluded)